

Report of Proceedings



Joint Special Operations University

SOF-Power Workshop



A Way Forward for
Special Operations Theory and Strategic Art

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Foreword

Modern military Special Operations arguably started with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in World War II and have maintained strategic utility for almost 70 years. The War on Terror, the Iraq War, and Afghanistan operations reinforced SOF's strategic utility in the 21st century, so much so, that in the last decade, the Special Operations Forces (SOF) structure has been limited more by the availability of qualified personnel than either mission requirements or funding. Regardless of the strategic history of modern SOF, research, thinking, and publication largely focus on Special Operations tactics and operational-level planning. Strategic-level thinking about military Special Operations is yet to be adequately developed. In order to bridge this gap, the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) Strategic Studies Department convened a SOF-Power Workshop in August 2011 to examine the role of military Special Operations (SOF-Power) in national security and the relevance and feasibility of a theory of Special Operations to inform and guide the development and use of Special Operations and SOF. Eleven participants from various SOF and relevant academic backgrounds participated: the SOF Chairs from PME institutions, Senior Fellows from the JSOU Strategic Studies Department, and others from non-military institutions with an interest in SOF strategic utility. In a relatively short time this group critically examined the role of military Special Operations in the 21st century and validated SOF-Power's continued strategic utility. From this foundation, the work group concluded the need for a unified theory of Special Operations as a foundational document for the pursuit of education and strategic art within the SOF community, and the greater military and political communities. This report documents the work group's insights and conclusions and provides recommendations for a way forward in broadening the strategic art in regard to SOF-Power.

KENNETH H. POOLE, Ed.D.
Director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department

Executive Summary

The individual military services' utility to the nation is defined and enhanced by the science and art of their application, often referred to as the military strategic art. Service strategic art is guided by broad warfare theories, principles, and specific experiential learning gained by using a distinct type of force in the physical domain in which they operate. This domain-centric approach has led to the development of theories for air warfare, land warfare, and sea warfare. Taken together these service theories provide the basis for service and joint doctrine and the U.S. practice of joint warfare. They also provide a basis for professional development within the services and support the development of resourcing requirements. Advocates of "spacepower" have also taken a domain-centric approach in advancing space theory and strategic art. In addition, while cyber-war has been designated as an across-domain capacity by Department of Defense (DoD), cyber-war theory and practice are informed by an understanding of the medium of a virtual, electronic terrain, the capabilities required to maneuver within it, and a strategic art of offense and defense. Yet, with 70 years of modern experience the nation's Special Operations Forces (SOF) have no articulated theory of Special Operations and institutionalized strategic art. SOF-Power, while increasingly used in practice, has learned and relearned the lessons of application without the support of an articulated and accepted Special Operations theory and strategic art. An increasing interest in and demand for such a SOF theoretical foundation resulted in the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) Strategic Studies Department conducting the SOF-Power Workshop and this report.

The SOF-Power Workshop brought together a group of interested persons to explore the following key questions: Is there a SOF power? Is there a need for Special Operations theory and strategic art? What are the parameters of such a theory and art? What is JSOU's way forward? The members of the workgroup consisted of 11 participants from various SOF and academic backgrounds: the SOF Chairs from professional military education (PME) institutions; Senior Fellows from the JSOU Strategic Studies Department; and selected academic and strategic thinkers associated with JSOU. In preparation, members reviewed selected literature and individually considered the issues. The workshop was held at the JSOU Pinewood Campus at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, from 22–23 August 2011.

The workgroup confirmed the Special Operations community lacks a unifying theory and associated literature on how Special Operations fit into national security policy even as preference for their use as an instrument of national policy increases. While literature resources have grown, they are largely focused on the tactical operations and tactics of Special Operations Forces. Little has been published that critically analyzes SOF's distinct operational and strategic roles, or how Special Operations fit into a comprehensive national security strategy which subsequently drives the need for SOF. SOF strategic art when practiced has been learned through mentoring and on the job. While this has sufficed in the past, it is not adequate for the emerging 21st century, and there is a great desire within the Special Operations community to foster and institutionalize strategic art as it relates to Special Operations.

SOF-Power and military Special Operations, while a subset of military theory, are sufficiently unique in nature and definition to require special study and consideration of theory and practice. For Special Operations, physical and virtual domains and cognitive, military, and political environments blend together to define the SOF operating environment. Thus, SOF operates within and across defined domains and in the seams and gaps among these domains.

While SOF support of conventional military operations in unconventional ways remains valid in the 21st century, SOF will increasingly be applied as a preferred instrument of policy in the seams and grey areas that exist among traditional methods of employment of national power. A Special Operations theory and a strategic art not only prepare Special Operations Forces for these roles--they also inform joint military commanders and policy decision makers on how best to apply SOF.

A nascent debate in regard to the uniqueness of Special Operations and the need for and parameters of a SOF strategic art has existed for some time—halted in development largely by the operational demands and focus created by 9-11. It has yet to coalesce into a unified theory—a theory that explains the whole of the phenomenon of Special Operations—and art, however the framework, discussion, and detailed recommendations offered in this report provide a basis for such a strategic theory and art. A satisfactory theory must explain the uniqueness of Special Operations, the phenomenon and relevance of SOF-Power, SOF operating environments, and the general principles for the use of SOF. Once articulated, it must be inculcated in the force and defense establishment.

The SOF-Power workshop recommends four major initiatives to be undertaken near-simultaneously and in a coordinated and integrated manner to advance the strategic art within SOF. These recommendations are:

- Encourage and support research and publication on a theory of Special Operations.
- Encourage and support research and publication of works on SOF-Power and its applicability in the near and long term.
- Develop appropriate SOF strategic art curriculums/perspectives and integrate them into the education of SOF and non-SOF PME.
- Develop and publish a supporting strategic-level course textbook for SOF students consisting of the best strategic thought from SOF operators, leaders, theorists, strategists, and supporters.

These initiatives are outlined in great detail in Appendix A, SOF-Power Workshop Recommendations; Appendix B, Recommended Subjects for SOF Strategic Art Curriculum; and Appendix C, Recommended Subjects for SOF Strategic Art Curriculum. Taken together they provide a framework for moving forward over time.

Section I. Introduction

One may have noticed that although there is an abundance of literature on the unconventional derring-do of SOF, discussion of their strategic value is all but nonexistent. That is a story much in need of telling, particularly since SOF assuredly will figure with increasing prominence in the strategic history of future warfare.¹

Colin S. Gray, Another Bloody Century

Special military operations have a long and varied history within the U.S. military from Roger's Rangers to today's military counterterrorism forces. Arguably, modern Special Operations Forces began in World War II with the formation of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and specialized military forces. While the numbers of SOF often waxed and waned in relation to national threats following the Second World War, the overall trends are ones of growing numbers and missions. Missions include support of conventional forces, and increasingly, more discrete policy actions. The increased preference and applicability of SOF as a distinct policy instrument makes Special Operations activities more critical in shaping a favorable 21st century environment. Future success requires a SOF strategic culture that constantly advances strategic thinking and education in a SOF strategic art. Such a culture must rest on the foundations of a unified theory of Special Operations and a body of knowledge to support the demands of educating a strategic force. However, the SOF community lacks a unifying theory of Special Operations and supporting literature as to how Special Operations make a strategic difference in national security. While literature resources have grown, they are largely focused on the tactical operations of Special Operations Forces.



Too little has been published that critically analyzes SOF's distinct strategic roles, or how Special Operations fit into a comprehensive national security strategy. SOF strategic art when practiced has been learned through mentoring and on the job. While this has sufficed in the past, it is not adequate for the emerging 21st century, and there is a growing desire within the Special Operations community to foster and institutionalize strategic art as it relates to Special Operations.

The shortfall in strategic culture has not gone unnoticed. Congressional creation of U.S. Special Operations command (USSOCOM), while heavily focused on proper resourcing, also represented recognition of the growing strategic role of SOF. In 2005, Michael Vickers identified developing Special Operations strategists as a critical shortfall in "Transforming US Special Operations Forces."² Others within the greater SOF community also advocate development of a

¹ Colin S. Gray, *Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare*, London: Phoenix, 2006, p. 252,

² Michael G. Vickers, "Transforming US Special Operations Forces" (Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments: Prepared for OSD Net Assessment, August 2005), 35.

SOF strategic perspective for the challenges of the 21st century. A promising debate in regard to the uniqueness of Special Operations and the need for and parameters of a SOF strategic art has existed for some time, but has been overshadowed by the operational demands and focus created by 9-11. As the wars generated by 9-11 diminish, an opportunity exists to examine recent experience in light of past history and take on the challenges of Special Operations theory and SOF art. To this end, the Joint Special Operations University Strategic Studies Department conducted a SOF-Power Workshop to consider the feasibility for the development of a unified theory of Special Operations—a theory that explains the whole of the phenomenon of Special Operations—and enhancement of strategic art within SOF. The workshop was held at the JSOU Pinewood Campus, MacDill AFB, Florida, from 22–23 August 2011.

This report provides the conclusions of that workshop and its recommendations for the way forward.

Section II. Methodology

The JSOU Strategic Studies Department SOF-Power Workshop used a guided small group discussion methodology to examine Special Operations theory and strategic art.

Eleven participants from various SOF and academic backgrounds were invited to the workshop. Invitees included: the SOF Chairs from PME institutions; Senior Fellows from the JSOU Strategic Studies Department; and other academic and strategic thinkers with an interest in SOF's strategic utility. A list of SOF-Power Workshop Participants and Contributors is provided in Appendix D.

COL (Retired) Joseph Celeski, a JSOU Senior Fellow, facilitated the group using a preset but flexible agenda provided in Appendix E.

Participants were provided read-ahead materials prior to the workshop and were asked to review and think about the topics of SOF-Power, Special Operations theory, and inculcating strategic art within the SOF community. Read-ahead materials are included in the references listed in Appendix F.

Conducted over a full two days, the workshop format consisted of short presentations as indicated in the agenda, followed by facilitated discussion and brainstorming sessions to reach conclusions and potential ways forward. Group consensus on key points, insights, and recommendations were recorded and are reflected in the narrative of this report and its appendices.

Section III. Background

*Special operations forces are a national grand-strategic asset: they are a tool of statecraft that can be employed quite surgically in support of diplomacy, of foreign assistance (of several kinds), as vital adjunct to regular military forces, or as an independent weapon.*³

Colin S. Gray

The military forces of the United States earn a “seat at the table” in national policy and security formulation and implementation based on their strategic utility in regard to the threats, challenges, and opportunities confronting the nation. Conflict theory lays the foundation for the use of military forces; however, each service and the collective joint force justifies and explains their applicability through their own theorists and strategists, who are well-founded in their specific strategic cultures. However, even though SOF is inherent to each, none of these military “power” formulations fully capture the strategic value of Special Operations as a unique entity in war and peace. Consequently, SOF has a logical responsibility to understand, articulate, and promote SOF theory and a SOF strategic culture.

The military services understand their current application of force by first understanding larger, germane war theory. For the U.S. Army, this larger theoretical understanding of the application of force is commonly referred to as *landpower*.⁴ Landpower derives from a wide body of works from theorists and practitioners who wrote on various aspects of land warfare, deriving important principles for the successful use of land armies. The Army uses such landpower theory to build a strategic culture that can apply landpower to contemporary issues, learning along the way and modifying landpower theory from its various experiences in conflict. The U.S. Navy, informed by theorists and strategists such as Mahan and Corbett, apply their forces strategically using the tenets of *seapower*. The U.S. Air Force strategic culture is founded in a number of theoretical constructs collectively referred to as *air power theory*.

Each of the services, once reaching a certain level of development, codified their strategic utility to the nation in order to articulate their application of force. In essence, the services graduated from the tactical and operational understanding of their service’s power to developing concepts of military power and force application at the strategic level. The evolution is remarkably similar, moving from tactical doctrine to operational and strategic thinking by key individuals, to strategic-level discourse in books and journals, to theories and strategic culture. Professional forces were created by the services insisting on educating generations of Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines on their forces’ application at their various service universities and colleges—always anchored in theory. Theory is the basis on which future forces will be justified and fought. Joint warfare, the product of theory, is the doctrinal and strategic integration of service capabilities.

For the last two decades of conflict involving U.S. military forces, SOF has honed their ability to operate at the tactical and operational levels of war and participate at the strategic level. Today, SOF personnel are recognized for the quality of their SOF supporting plans to the

³ Colin S. Gray, *Explorations in Strategy*, Praeger, Westport, CT: 1996, p. 149.

⁴ Army Field Manual 1, *The Army*, Department of Army, Washington, D.C., June 14, 2005, describes landpower as the ability, by threat, force or occupation, to promptly gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources and people.

Geographical Combatant Commander's operational plans (OPLANS), contributions to theater engagement strategies, and USSOCOM's war planning. Like the military services, the Special Operations community, after approximately seven decades of experience, has arrived at a historical point where a more definitive understanding of the strategic application of Special Operations and the nature, strategic utility, and purpose of the force is emerging. It provides a window of opportunity to achieve a strategic culture with which to confront the challenges of the 21st century.

The current expertise cannot be lost and should be built upon. The fostering of the knowledge of strategic art as it relates to one's military service or role is the essence of a healthy strategic culture. For the SOF or the service professional, such knowledge is well-founded in more general conflict and military theories, but an understanding of their particular force's nature and role as an instrument of military power creates the strategic asset. Such knowledge is the enabler that provides strategic depth in a force, defines its culture, and protects its ethos. The attainment of this level of knowledge in force development is critical and should be considered a key Logical Line of Operation and one of the objectives of the organizational vision. Once institutionalized, such knowledge becomes a part of the greater military and policy paradigm. Done properly, such development builds a better force to serve the nation and creates the conditions for advice on the best use of the force. Knowledge and proficiency in the strategic art level of war promotes proper use of the force and averts its misapplication. Hence, the participants concluded that an understanding of the theoretical nature of Special Operations and the strategic function of the force (SOF-Power) must be inculcated within the SOF knowledge and art.

As noted elsewhere, knowledge of SOF strategic art certainly exists within the SOF community, but as a result of organizational structure, operational priorities, and differing focuses such strategic thinking is scattered amongst the service SOF, the U.S. Special Operations Command staff, the staffs of the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs), PME institutions, and the academic and publication endeavors of the SOF Senior Fellows and others. No systematic process currently exists to encourage, capture, sustain, and inculcate such strategic wisdom into the culture. Steps can and should be taken to aggregate, build on, and promote such resources in a manner to enhance our understanding of strategic art and application of SOF. The Special Operations community can benefit by institutionalizing the hard-won strategic lessons of the last decade and thinking deeper about their implications for SOF in the future. There is a logical way forward.

Section IV. Framing the Requirement

Strategic art entails the orchestration of all the instruments of national power to yield specific, well-defined end states. Desired end states and strategic outcomes derive from the national interests and are variously defined in terms of physical security, economic well-being, and the promotion of values. Strategic art, broadly defined, is therefore: The skillful formulation, coordination, and application of ends (objectives), ways (courses of action), and means (supporting resources) to promote and defend the national interests.⁵

Major General Richard A. Chilcoat

Throughout the workshop participants were challenged by the facilitator to engage in a free-flowing discussion to frame the requirement for Special Operations theory and strategic culture with a series of questions. Is SOF power distinct, and can it be described uniquely? Is there a need for a unified theory of Special Operations? If so, why is there a lack of such a theory? If conceptually SOF-Power can be described uniquely, how would it be defined, and what are its constituent parts? What must a unified theory accomplish and incorporate? What are the challenges to effectively gathering together SOF strategic thought and enhancing strategic art within the SOF community and the larger defense and policy communities? How might these challenges be addressed? Both the facilitator and participants understood most of these questions could not be answered definitively in the workshop, but that the workshop's purpose was to provide a framework as a way forward.

The military services' strategic utility to the nation are defined by the science and art of their application, which is rooted in warfare theories and experience relevant to a distinct type of force based on a particular domain. In essence, the services claim dominion over that form of warfare: air warfare, land warfare, and sea warfare. Warfare domains are not to be confused with warfare environments: urban, desert, jungle, coastal, etc. There are also types and ways of warfare: conventional, unconventional, irregular, and so on. Special Operations theory and practice must consider SOF-Power relative to each of these.

SOF-Power

The workshop participants concluded the power represented by SOF, while part of the military power construct, was distinct and can be described uniquely in a manner similar to the military services or other specific instruments of power. They reached this conclusion by the simple expedient of drafting a potential definition following discussions of the characteristics and capabilities of SOF as an instrument. While not advocating the following definition should be adopted directly, the group consensus was that it sufficiently demonstrated SOF-Power's distinctness and uniqueness and could serve as a springboard for more thought.

SOF-Power – noun 1. The total strength of a nation's specialized military capabilities to conduct and influence activities in, through, and from chaotic environments, domain gaps, and in politically sensitive situations where the use of conventional forces is negated or not desired, in order to achieve U.S. national

⁵ Major General Richard A. Chilcoat, *Strategic Art: The New Discipline for 21st Century Leaders*, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA, 1995, p.4.

security objectives, both in peacetime and in war. 2. Local control and relative superiority by application of Special Operations over adversary forces who use political violence as a means to contest the legitimacy of a sovereign state. If conditions are favorable in the environment, SOF can dominate the situation using service enablers and leveraging indigenous forces.

SOF-Power Workshop Derived Definition (23 August 2011)

In addition to individual knowledge and analysis, three specific references were used for the workshop to stimulate thinking and discussion in regard to the constructs of explaining military power: Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy*, Oxford University Press, New York: 1999; Charles D. Lutes and Peter L. Hays (editors), *Toward a Theory of Space Power*, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington, D.C.: 2011; and Geoffrey Till, *SEAPOWER: A Guide for the 21st Century*, Routledge, New York: 2009 (2nd Ed.). With these as common models and a review of historical cases of SOF-centric strategy combined with their knowledge of SOF literature, doctrine and culture, and experience, the group sought a consensus of understanding on what SOF brings to the fight and how SOF uses their “power” to achieve an outcome. Again, given the time constraints the group’s focus was on the feasibility of SOF power, theory, and strategic art, not on being definitive in regard to any of them.

From these discussions, workshop participants identified candidate propositions and characteristics from which SOF-power emanates:

- By enabling and leveraging others (through, with, and by...)
- Through the use of influence
- Persistent presence
- Ability to shape/change/transform the landscape
- Flexibility/adaptation/creativity
- Specialized training, tactics, equipment, etc.
- A unique ethos/seasoned and mature/discretion
- Unique resourcing (MFP-11)
- Inherently joint: Standing joint forces which can rapidly deploy—one stop shopping for customers
- Habitual and personal relationships (foreign, interagency, etc.)
- Horizontal integration skills – wide field of view
- Cultural knowledge and sensitivity
- Understanding of the political nature of conflict and political risk associated with employment of Special Operations
- Rapid response/expeditionary
- Resourcefulness and cost-effectiveness
- Decentralized operations, bottoms-up mission planning
- Flattened C2
- SOF strategic utility involves both non-kinetic and kinetic effects

While not exhaustive or perhaps best articulated, the candidate list demonstrates and distinguishes SOF’s focus from the services and illustrates its uniqueness in terms of a collective capability or power.

In a similar manner, the participants identified a contender list of capabilities or effects that can be attributed to SOF as an instrument of power:

- SOF have the power to free the oppressed and restore legitimacy of sovereign nations.
- SOF have a unique deterrent and countervailing effect in counterterrorism with the capability to conduct human precision targeting and surgically precise actions.
- SOF have the ability to provide support to resistance movements to assist a populace in overthrowing totalitarian governments.
- SOF can create global counterterrorism and Special Operations networks.
- SOF can provide security to populations in denied territory.
- SOF can unilaterally serve as the military instrument of national power to a whole of government approach for solutions in chaotic environments; this is an ability to achieve national security objectives outside the realm of conventional war (SOF provide an unconventional solution to an unconventional problem).
- SOF can uniquely influence outcomes versus achieving outcomes (indirect approach).
- SOF provide an extension of national military power through uniquely tailored policy options (includes the use of violence).
- SOF work as the "fog and friction" on the adversary through erosion, exhaustion, and attrition.
- SOF can access and operate in denied and non-permissive environments.
- SOF can transform tactical excellence into direct strategic effects.
- SOF outreach in education and knowledge sharing assist in fostering global SOF alliances that project credible influence.

The group concluded SOF-Power is a viable concept with strategic utility that should be further developed and articulated to enhance the utility of Special Operations Forces and broaden the policy options of the U.S. government. Its further development should include refinement and enlargement of the ideas above and advancement of an understanding of SOF-Power's "domain" and operating environments. This understanding should lead to a supporting theory or theories and the literature, curriculums, and practices that encourage a strategic culture and the practice of a SOF strategic art.

Special Operations and Domains

Domains are the highest order consideration in achieving a national security community consensus for recognizing the need for a distinct military service. While one or more military services can operate within a domain by cross-cutting—e.g., both air and naval forces can operate to control the maritime domain—one service normally claims dominance and assumes responsibility to organize and apply forces to secure the domain in question. It is from this enduring precept that each service claims its relevant form of "power," and thus justifies its purpose and resourcing. In examining the role of domains in SOF-Power, group discussion was stimulated by a number of key questions. What defines a domain? Is it necessary to have a defined domain to espouse a form of military power? Are there geo-political domains in which SOF operate that are not championed in current military strategy? For example, is there a human domain? A cognitive domain? How does SOF interact and interface in domains where others have traditional or applicable prominence and vested interest? Such questions and the answers

are fundamental to any Special Operations theory and the practice of a SOF art. While there are various ways of approaching SOF and domains, the workshop participants then addressed their understanding of current thought on the meaning of domains.

Currently, there are five widely recognized domains for military operations in the literature: air, maritime, land, cyber, and space. Only cyberspace is a virtual domain; all others are geographic in nature.⁶ Domains can be national such as the sovereign territory of the United States or they can be part of the “global commons” as the philosopher Hugo Grotius declared in the 17th century—places open to all men and where nations conduct commerce and diplomatic interchanges in order to become prosperous—open sea, space, cyberspace, etc. In either case, the domains must be secured and managed in accordance with the rule of law to achieve goals such as security and economic well-being.

Adversaries may threaten the safety of nations and citizens within any particular domain or across multiple domains, requiring military forces to “secure” the domains. Historically, controlling or achieving an acceptable level of security in a domain requires a specifically tailored military force with enough power to achieve dominance or positive influence over the activities within the domain—thus rendering it safe for the nation’s purposes. Military services do not operate independently within these domains; they interface and interact among themselves, the interagency, and allies and coalitions to support national interests. Services also may have common capabilities. However, the domain specialization of a service as conveyed in capabilities, doctrine, theories, and prevalence and preponderance define them as landpower, seapower, or airpower. The Marine Corps, as a service, exists as hybrid: a landpower auxiliary to maritime power with air capabilities.

Although SOF cannot claim prevalence or preponderance in any of the existing domains, the group did not think this posed significant limitations on the theoretical consideration of the strategic application of SOF-Power. The notion of a domain defining your military power may be looked at differently when applying SOF. Special Operations could be considered “multi-domain,” “cross-domain,” or applicable to operating in domain gaps and seams whereby they enable other military power to enhance their operations, supplement their capabilities, or extend their strategic reach. Given the modern experience, it might also be argued that SOF is strategically applicable independently of the military formulation of domains and can be used as a tool in other policy applications for the same reasons.

On occasion, Special Operations activities might achieve a form of dominance when conventional forces are absent from some portion of a domain or in environments where traditional application of force has no applicability. SOF can achieve “relative superiority” when properly applied and can locally dominate an adversary and secure the populace and vulnerable centers of gravity. However, control for SOF is more the ability to affect events. The participants engaged with the notion of a descriptive SOF domain to illustrate SOF-Power. Ideas such as the *Domain of the Gaps* and *Condition of Chaos* were discussed, but there was no consensus that they were encompassing enough. More intellectual work with domains may lead to fruitful results or add to the SOF mosaic.

Some in the working group advocated it may not be necessary to identify a unique domain for SOF and the conduct of Special Operations. Here the argument was SOF brings a form of military power to the security environment, and its function and form can be described and applied independently from a particular domain. Additionally, SOF achieves utility in domains

⁶ Note that subsequent to this workshop, DoD directed that the word domain not be used with cyberspace because cyberspace cuts across all domains.

and environments because they in fact are not employed to dominate or achieve a SOF superiority over the adversary. For instance, a SOF application can leverage indigenous power to dominate or achieve superiority over an adversary. SOF might create the trigger event for an adversary's collapse or create a level of "fog and friction" to cause exhaustive and attrition-like effects.

In the end, a consensus emerged among the group for considering SOF a multi-and cross-domain force, capable of conducting or supporting conventional or unconventional operations on various levels leading to or supporting military and political outcomes. Nonetheless, more work on SOF's alignment with domains is indicated.

The SOF Operating Environment and Warfare

In order to provide an enduring theory of Special Operations, which can explain the phenomenon and outline broad and general principles for the use of SOF, an understanding of SOF operating environments and warfare must be developed consistent with SOF-Power. For Special Operations, physical and virtual domains and cognitive, military, and political environments blend together to define the SOF operating environment. Thus SOF operates within and across defined domains and in the seams and gaps among these domains. However, while SOF support of conventional military operations in unconventional ways remains valid in the 21st century, SOF will increasingly be used as an instrument of policy in the gray areas that exist among traditional methods of employment of national power.

The group reached rapid consensus on conventional operating environments in which SOF played a supporting role to conventional forces or unconventional open conflict where conventional forces might even support a primary SOF role, as in early Afghanistan. Other known applications of SOF were more difficult to codify as environments. Perhaps the boundaries of general military theory are not adequate for framing either the environment or the domain of these applications. Political warfare theory may help fill this shortfall. Such theory seeks to explain political violence short of traditional warfare. If so, the term political violence may be problematic even if the theory is useful. Americans do not like the term. Other theories relative to international relations, security, stability, and violence may also be part of a suitable framework.

SOF by definition fill a void in capabilities of traditional forces taking on challenges these forces are not structured, authorized, or resourced to do other than with service SOF. SOF also interact with, support, and fill voids in capabilities in the interagency. In environments where there is a lack of an instrument of national power to respond and where use of more traditional instruments has less strategic utility or higher costs and risks, SOF have been particularly useful. In fact, SOF strategic utility may be greatest in military and political situations characterized by nontraditional environments. In these conditions SOF can achieve military objectives and equally important national security objectives with minimal investment, a smaller footprint, and lower political risk. Such operating environments require a deft hand and surgical precision, which SOF by nature are highly adept at providing.

In addition to more conventional environments, the working group developed the following environments as conceptual models for articulating additional SOF operating environments.

- **The complex operating environment.** This environment is marked by instability and ambiguity; acts of violence, influence, and leverage are conducted in a non-linear and

often indirect way. These could be weak states or ungoverned areas where U.S. interests are high or environments created by the seams in international rule of law and governance in which non-state actors rise as threats. Operations in this environment include low-level operations of subtlety and guile.

- **The High-Risk, Highly-Sensitive Environment.** These environments are usually in denied areas where knowledge of U.S. operations could be highly damaging politically. There is high personal risk and high political risk in conducting operations in these environments. A very high degree of specialized training and application of specialized tactics is required to operate effectively. Operations in this environment are of a covert or clandestine nature.
- **The Irregular Warfare Environment.** Irregular warfare environments are characterized by intra-state and sub-state acts of political violence. Adversaries in these environments are focused on the overthrow and replacement of the state or attempts to change policies. These environments are characterized by insurgency, subversion, violent political action, and terrorism. They are inherently population centric. Operations in such environments require forces with low-visibility, who are comfortable in conducting military and political activities not normally associated with open warfare.

The workshop participants agreed SOF are applicable across the spectrum of conflict—in peace and in the various types of warfare. Yet, the greatest strategic utility appears to apply to the less traditional environments. There is a reason Special Operations work in these environments, and it should be captured in Special Operations theory and practiced in a strategic art.

Section V. Toward a Military Theory of Special Operations

*There is a great deal of tactical doctrine for special forces, but virtually no relevant strategic theory or history.*⁷

Colin Gray, Modern Strategy

The workshop devoted significant time and effort to the challenging proposition of a unified theory of Special Operations—a theory that explains the whole of the phenomenon of Special Operations. Organizers and participants recognized that the workshop could not produce such a theory in the time allotted, and the focus was on providing insights and guidance to those who might undertake the task. Again a series of questions guided the discussion. What are the obstacles and challenges to writing such a theory? What purposes must the theory serve? What are its limitations? How should the theory be structured? What should it address? What advice and ideas can be offered for consideration by a theorist? How might it be framed?

Background reading materials prepared the participants for this discussion. In addition to the military classics, the three modern sources listed below were particularly useful in understanding the construct of military theories and aspects participants found particularly noteworthy are highlighted below:

- Milan Vego, “On Military Theory,” in *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Issue 62, 3rd Quarter 2011, pp. 59–67.
- Harold R. Winton, “On the Nature of Military Theory” in *Toward a Theory of Spacepower*, editors Charles D. Lutes and Peter L. Hays, The Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington, DC: 2011, pp.19 – 35.
- Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy*, Oxford University Press, New York: 1999.

Obstacles and Challenges to a Theory

An obvious question in the minds of the participants was why no one had yet produced a unified theory of Special Operations. The contemporary SOF community possesses more than enough experience and strategic maturity to apply reflective thinking toward the development of such a theory. SOF senior leaders and others have addressed theoretical aspects of Special Operations in speeches, lectures, briefings, Congressional testimony, and publications—some significantly so, but no one has proposed a unified theory. The group spent some time exploring what might be inhibiting this endeavor because this introspection provides insights into possible obstacles and challenges to a way forward. The conclusions reached were:

- We are not yet matured enough as a service-like entity to be concerned about reflection on our experiences in order to express the phenomenon of Special Operations.
- We already understand tactical excellence to achieve strategic effect, so there is no need for theory—we can just keep adapting, remain innovative and flexible, and not get tied down with theory. The latter reflects concerns about proscriptive theory as opposed to descriptive theory.

⁷Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy*, Oxford University Press, New York:1999, p. 290.

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- We have only now reached the point in our history where we have learned enough about the tactical, operational, and strategic nature of Special Operations to understand the geo-strategic utility of SOF, and therefore we could not have done this any earlier.
 - We do not “own a domain,” and the theories of others who do are suitable.
 - We have not fully encouraged or collaborated in an appropriate manner with existing SOF strategists or potential theorists to persuade them to undertake a unified theory.
 - We have not built an adequate bench of Special Operations theorists and strategists who can broaden and deepen the theoretical and strategic thinking on Special Operations. We have not built an environment that will produce a Clause-SOF-witz.

None of these are entirely true, but some basis exists for their persistence. They are part of a collective mindset that must be overcome in any design to move forward. These mindsets are not unique to SOF, and every new military phenomenon’s theorists have been confronted with similar obstacles and challenges.

On Military Theory

The workshop members began their consideration of SOF theory by examining what others had to say about theory in general and military theory in particular. Much exists in recent literature on theory in general. It has been defined and various constructs have been developed for different disciplines. In its simplest form, a theory is a way of thinking or a belief about a subject. It is a narrative which describes a phenomenon. In general, good theories (based on a synopsis of the sources referenced earlier):

- Explain the nature and purpose of the subject.
- Seek a narrative “truth” on the subject.
- Explain this truth through generalized propositions which are descriptive and guiding as opposed to proscriptive.
- Develop relevant concepts and ideas.
- Explain the relationships of these concepts and ideas, internally and externally.
- Are informed by history.
- Explain future applications.

The group found the opening paragraphs of Milan Vego’s article particularly insightful here:

In generic terms, a theory can be described as a coherent group of general propositions used to explain a given class or phenomenon. [Webster] It is a precise consideration of a subject to obtain fundamental knowledge. It is the teaching of the truth of a subject. [Alfred Stenzel, *Kriegsfuehringzur See*, 1913] In the scientific sense, a theory does not need to be supported or contradicted by evidence. In addition, it does not necessarily mean that the scientific community accepts a given theory. [Wade A. Tisthammer, “The Nature and Philosophy of Science”]

In the broad definition of the term, military theory can be described as a comprehensive analysis of all the aspects of warfare, its pattern and inner

structure, and the mutual relationships of its various components/elements. It also encapsulates political, economic, and social relationships within a society and among the societies that create conflict and lead to a war. Sound military theory explains how to conduct and win a war. It also includes the use of military force to prevent the outbreak of war.

Military theories are differentiated according to their purpose and scope.⁸

In “On the Nature of Military Theory,” Harold R. Winton reinforced the idea that new phenomenon in military warfare should be captured by theory and suggests a variety of reasons that justify it: there is dissatisfaction with existing theory to explain the phenomenon; people can comprehend the new phenomenon better if it has some conceptual construct; and last, but most important, it is better to have a theory on the new phenomenon than not have one, lest the capability to be successful in conflict suffers.⁹ From his study he concludes military theories may be broad, general theories, such as Clausewitz’ unified theory of war in *On War*, or restricted to a particular field of study (Nuclear Deterrence), a particular way of warfare (Revolutionary Warfare) or, as a way to explain an event in military history (the theory of strategic bombing in WWII). Winton argues theory has five functions. First, it defines the “class of phenomenon” and its propositions. Second, it then breaks it into its constituent parts, which he calls categorizing. Third, theory explains. Fourth, it connects its subject of study to other related fields. Finally, theory anticipates by going beyond experience and seeing what is possible. He further offers that military theories should be simplified; explain the contribution to national security; take into account past experiences; encompass broad principles, and most importantly, ensure the theory assists in the self-education of military professionals. Winton’s insights, while directed at spacepower, justify the pursuit of a unified Special Operations theory and provide one paradigm for its construction.¹⁰

Colin Gray is one of the most prolific writers on military theory and a theorist in his own right. In *Modern Strategy* (1999), Gray explains the distinct types of military strategy. He identifies four. One type is a theory which transcends time. For example, Clausewitz and Sun Tzu developed theories that are still valid today even though their worlds no longer exist. Articulating how geography and the functional complexities of war and strategy interact is another type. Landpower, seapower, and airpower possess obvious attributes of this type in their focus on domains and “power.” A third type focuses a specific kind or use of military power that affects strategically the course of a conflict. Evolving works on cyberspace and cyberpower seem to adhere to this paradigm. The final type is a theory that explains a historical event in context, such as the theory of strategic bombing in World War II.¹¹ Gray is identifying distinctions in military theory types in order to better explain military strategy, but much military theory has attributes of more than one type.

Gray has a keen interest in a Special Operations theory as evidenced throughout this report, but he has largely only challenged others to pursue it. On the other hand, the participants found he had addressed the requirements for spacepower theory more thoroughly in *Modern Strategy*.

⁸Milan Vego, “On Military Theory” in *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Issue 62, 3rd Quarter 2011, p. 60.

⁹Harold R. Winton, “On the Nature of Military Theory” in *Toward a Theory of Spacepower*, editors Charles D. Lutes and Peter L. Hays, The Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington, DC: 2011, p.19.

¹⁰ Winton, pp. 20-32.

¹¹ Gray, *Modern Strategy*, pp. 125-126.

Those who read *On War*, or know Gray's Clausewitzian predilection, will recognize the Prussian's influence in Gray's advice in regard to developing spacepower theory and the universality of Clausewitz unified theory of war and strategy presented below, which the working group paraphrased for relevancy to building a Special Operations theory.

- Effects on land are paramount: this is where people live and this is where military actions ultimately have strategic meaning. Any theory of Special Operations must take that into account and explain its relationship and interdependence with landpower theories (same applies to international relations theories).
- Strategy and strategic application of force have their own logic; SOF may do things their "own way," but they must abide by immutable laws.
- SOF-Power is probably more akin to seapower than to any other theories.
- SOF will need to explain their theory and how it has meaning for purposes of policy.
- What are centers of gravity in the Special Operations world? Their adversary's centers of gravity? How will the theory address SOF utility in this matter?
- What is fog and friction in this type of warfare? How will SOF address this?
- The Special Operations theory must illustrate SOF as a team player, how they unify efforts, and the interdependencies and the value Special Operations add as a force multiplier.
- The theory must describe what Special Operations accomplish under particular conditions (general war, peacetime, irregular warfare (IW), political warfare, etc.).
- How are SOF employed proportionately and discriminately (just war will be a continuing theme in the future)?
- How do SOF achieve relative superiority, or overwhelming strength at decisive points?
- If defense is the stronger form of war, how do SOF achieve/enable this?¹²

This session ended with a good grounding and consensus on the need, types, complexities, paradigms, and mechanics of crafting military theory. Such rules, principles, caveats, etc., provided a foundation for the follow-on session in which the focus shifted to the crafting of a unified theory of Special Operations.

On Development of a Military Unified Theory of Special Operations

For the purpose of the workshop group's objectives in developing Special Operations theory, the group agreed it should be a unified military theory of Special Operations, which may substantiate existing SOF and other fields of study, but is open to new categories and explanations. Such an approach is logically a sub-discipline of general military theory and supports military art and science. However, SOF's purposes may extend beyond traditional military theory and art and, if so, must be addressed. This session was also informed by resource material and presentations, and selected content is presented herein. All of it and the individual participants' knowledge and input are reflected in the consensus narrative and conclusions of this subsection.

¹²Gray, *Modern Strategy*, pp. 256-257.

Parts of an interview with Mr. Rich Higgins, conducted in the spring of 2010 at the National War College, were shared with the participants. Mr. Higgins offers an insightful and useful synopsis of the nature of Special Operations and their purpose:

Special Operations are those activities of unorthodox nature applied to increase the ‘fog and friction’ of war on our adversaries; if applied correctly, they can achieve strategic effects in the arena of grand strategy, independent of operational art associated with campaign plans and objectives. In campaigns, these actions are applied to improve conventional force maneuver in achieving military objectives. When not in conflict, these activities enhance the achievement of diplomatic and foreign policy initiatives of the United States. The conduct of these activities requires specialized personnel, specialized training, and governmental and military leadership to foster, support, and administer Special Operations Forces to guarantee their success.¹³

Colonel (Retired) John Jogerst engaged the workshop in a short session on developing a Special Operations theory to start this session. His session advanced a number of key points and questions for consideration in developing a theory, and these points are articulated below:

- Past efforts to describe the application of SOF were deductive—in other words, they extracted the characteristics of SOF units and operations while looking for common threads. Developing a unified theory for Special Operations will require an inductive approach, starting from consideration of international relations and national requirements for the conduct of relations between nations and down to SOF. Given those requirements, what special capabilities are needed to meet those requirements?
- Of these needed capabilities, which require the legally sanctioned use of force—these are potentially military Special Operations, even during political warfare events. Militaries are a tool for a nation to employ violence, or the threat of violence, to achieve national security objectives. Military violence is legally sanctioned with authoritative control and legally enforced responsibility. The military provides a hierarchy of authority, enforced responsibility for actions and mission outcomes, as well as security.
- Foreign policy theory’s framework is international relations. These are a range of government actions and tools to achieve goals. The tools and actions are conveyed in DIMEFIL and other constructs. It is important in foreign policy to look at what needs to be done. Our options for action in the construct of international relations when confronted with opposition include our ability to co-opt, assist, advise, persuade, reward, purchase, ignore, deter, coerce and compel, deny and discredit (the adversary objective), or to damage, destroy, and control through war, conquest, or occupation. There are many options short of war.
- To increase the strategic utility of military force in the range of military options short of war, the force must be small (remain below “war” threshold) and fairly independent (no large C2 structure). Some historical examples of a “managed footprint” might include the strategic mission conducted by Lewis and Clark or even the pursuit of Pancho Villa. This

¹³Mr. Rich Higgins, former Director of Irregular Warfare Support Program in the Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office, now ASD-SOLIC Chair at National War College, interview by COL (Retired) Joseph Celeski, Spring of 2010, Washington, DC.

is the first thread of the utility of SOF—useable military capabilities for tailored policy actions at acceptable costs and risks. The second thread is to have SOF capabilities useful to conventional military operations in war.

- Much of what we now call SOF are forces relatively well resourced for wartime priorities. These are essentially small units using resources that are a small fraction of the overall military budget. The hyper-infantry aspects of SOF—our direct action, scouting, and raiding forces—have become extremely capable under this model. It has also created tension and identity issues within the force between direct and indirect advocates. However, both threads of force employment—an instrument of foreign policy and a specialized capability in conventional warfare—are a national requirement and not an either/or proposition. Any theory of Special Operations must address both threads.
- Perhaps SOF's highest efficacy is when one considers that Special Operations are the use of legally sanctioned violence by a legally responsible organization, short of war. The past utility of SOF in this construct has been in preventing war or not running the risk of conventional war. In the future, SOF's appeal may be high because war will not be a practical option. The international climate, the U.S. public's aversion to intervention, the rise of non-state actors who are asymmetric to conventional forces, or unacceptable risks of escalation suggest a security climate in which SOF strategic utility has great appeal.¹⁴

In discussion, the workshop participants derived the following Special Operations strategic applications for consideration in the development of a theory:


- Strategic attack, countervailing, deterrence as a force in being— counterterrorism, counter-proliferation, and counter-weapons of mass destruction (WMD) activities.
- Gathering of strategic intelligence—intentions and warning.
- Influence operations—Military Information Support Operations (MISO), Civil Affairs (CA), relationship building, etc.
- Humanitarian—CA, Civil-Military Operations (CMO), Humanitarian Assistance (HA), Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO), PKO, disaster relief, and to some extent Counternarcotics (CN)/Counterdrug (CD).
- Political Warfare—unconventional warfare (UW), psychological warfare (PSYWAR), and counterinsurgency (COIN).
- Coercive Diplomacy—Flexible deterrent options with SOF components.
- Prevention/Phase 0—Building Partner Capacity (BPC), Security Assistance (SA), Security Force Assistance (SFA), and Foreign Internal Defense (FID).
- Conflict—Special Operations support of conventional forces in war.

During the workshop a number of current and historical cases where SOF-centric strategic concepts were instrumental were used to illustrate participants' particular points of view and may be helpful in researching, developing, testing, and explaining theory. The Secret War in Laos was unconventional warfare and practiced covert or secret war. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and the greater Global War on Terror (GWOT) illustrate counterterrorism, building SOF Networks, strategic precision strike, and working with partners and conventional forces. Enhancing conventional forces maneuver is also evident in OEF/OIF

¹⁴John Jogerst, Col (Ret) USAF, past Air War College SOF Chair, Commandant USAFSOS, JSOU Senior Fellow.

and with the OSS in World War II. SOF as a preferred choice of force for diplomacy is evident in FID/COIN in El Salvador and Operation Earnest Will. One can find elements of providing “fog and friction” to create exhaustion/erosion in the current efforts in the Philippines as well as World War II.

Colonel (Retired) Joe Celeski, conducted a session in which the group focused on bringing the components of a theory together into a coherent whole. He offered a preview of his own thinking in regard to theory in the chart below. Extracted from his SOF strategic application briefing in which he ends with “one chart says it all...,” the chart demonstrates how the pieces might come together whether all is said by the chart or not. In his construct, SOF-Power is applicable in political warfare—political violence short of war, irregular warfare, and conventional warfare. This construct suggests theory related to each type of warfare may provide insights to and pieces of a unified Special Operations theory. Some in the group thought these three were not inclusive enough, but nonetheless the use of other theories is made evident in this chart.



By categorizing the purposes and roles of SOF under these three broad categories, labeling component parts, and relating them to utility and performance, Colonel (Retired) Celeski advances major propositions to his audiences that help them comprehend the strategic utility of SOF and how best to apply SOF for maximum efficacy. For example, he notes that while all are valid, SOF application in political warfare, as he has expressed it here, is characterized by relative greater strategic utility and performance, as well as a correspondingly higher risk and higher payoff. Hence, the greater the propositions for efficacy of SOF are adhered to, the greater strategic utility and success. The more SOF-unique inputs are removed from optimum

propositions, the likelier the misapplication or inefficacy of SOF. As employment as traditional infantry forces in conventional roles is approached, the output results grow more and more tactical, vice strategic. Although not intended as a unified theory for Special Operations, this provides useful perspectives for those who may write Special Operations theory.

Special Operations theory must answer the questions of what is SOF-Power, and how do military Special Operations, in general, work? Its propositions in regard to SOF's purpose and nature must be consistent with historical experience even as it anticipates a 21st century future in its constructs. It should be a narrative that provides insight and poses intellectual questions that encapsulate what users of the theory need to think about. A Special Operations theory should serve as a capstone document connecting our beliefs, ethos, and why we exist as political-military warriors serving the military and diplomatic needs of our national security apparatus. A theory would also logically go far to help explain the foundational principles for the successful employment of Special Operations, and why, given certain conditions, Special Operations may be a greater or less optimal choice in policy and military decision making. Further, the workshop group agreed that the writing of theory should incorporate simplicity and be general in nature, espousing general applications of SOF as opposed to specific ones.

Some caveats were offered in the course of the discussion. The Special Operations theory should be limited to a narrowly defined SOF role—it cannot describe SOF as the answer to every problem, so it will require discipline to define the lanes in which SOF are applied. One respondent stated, “Do not let the force of choice describe the strategic utility of SOF.” A theory for Special Operations, if well understood, will not only inform on the application of SOF (as well as to prioritize its use), but also inform on the misapplication of SOF.

Discussion ended with the construction of a potential Special Operations theory model reflecting the exchange of ideas.

- Define the world from a security aspect meaningful to SOF, perhaps similar to the USSOCOM Strategic Appreciation.
- Explain the nature and purpose of SOF-Power and Special Operations.
- Explain what is distinct about Special Operations/SOF.
- Seek a narrative “truth” that interconnects SOF-Power, Special Operations, and SOF with the espoused security environment.
- Explain this truth through generalized propositions which are descriptive and guiding as opposed to proscriptive. Such propositions must relate to the past and anticipate the future. Develop these propositions into relevant concepts and ideas, and explain the relationships of these concepts and ideas internally and externally.
- Categorize constituent parts.
- Connect to broader fields such as general military theory, international relations theory, conflict theory, etc.
- Explain or illustrate applications of the propositions, concepts, and ideas in the real world through use of historical and contemporary cases or anticipated and plausible scenarios.
- Anticipate future applications.

Consensus existed as to a need to explain the phenomenon of Special Operations and what has been driving the expanded use and increasing call for more SOF solutions to the complex challenges of the 21st century. This session became the critical point of the workshop. Without theory as background and a foundation, participants felt strategic concepts and doctrine can go

down any road, either by the vagaries of the moment or through considering only contemporary security context. Without a theoretical base there is no logical recourse to budget dilemmas or personality-driven resolutions because there is no basis for debate. Foundational theory expresses timeless truths in ways that allow doctrine and strategic application to adapt, but safeguard them from ineptitude and faddish inclinations.

Section VI. Challenges and Way Ahead

*Theory cannot be accepted as conclusive when practice points the other way.*¹⁵

Charles E. Callwell, Small Wars (1906)

In the remainder of its time, the workshop focused its efforts on determining recommendations for a way ahead for the sustainment and further advancement of a strategic culture and the practice of the strategic art in the SOF community. Such a way forward must also consider communities outside of SOF and inform and win them over in regard to the proper strategic utility of SOF. Fortunately, the workshop discussions provided ample fodder for this task. Four major lines of operations emerged for the Joint Special Operations University to pursue. Discussions in regard to them are in this section, but detailed and specific steps are provided in Appendix A, B, and C.

There is a great desire within the Special Operations community to foster and institutionalize strategic art as it relates to Special Operations. Efforts are ongoing. Various strategic products have emerged from the U.S. Special Operations Command that will shape and guide the future, particularly in the arena of Special Operations Forces application and design. The Joint Special Operations University is maturing its instruction in strategic thinking and advancing research on Special Operations warfare through its publications series. The SOF academic chairs at the service PME institutions are beginning to reshape their courses to include SOF's strategic utility. However, as they are, these efforts are not enough.

What is SOF-Power in the 21st century? How does it work? What are its optimal uses? How do we build and nurture it? How does it integrate with other instruments of national power in a whole of government approach? How does it integrate into broader, comprehensive global approaches? These are all important questions among many others that require answers if SOF is to serve the nation well in the 21st century. The workshop group concluded more research and debate on SOF-Power and its applicability in the near and long term should be encouraged and supported.

It was evident to the workshop participants from their analysis that a healthy strategic culture and the proper practice of a SOF strategic art hinged on development of suitable theory. Theory undergirds the professional development of the force, its application, its doctrine, and its resourcing. It is also important to articulate to the nation and other audiences why we have SOF and its proper strategic utility. The most striking need is for a unified theory of Special Operations, and this challenge should be promoted in any available forum. A large part of the workshop time focused on this need. However, military theory in regard to SOF can take other forms, and the participants were well aware of this from the diversity of perspectives among themselves. Theoretical constructs could address different aspects of SOF or there may be multiple perspectives of a unified theory that must be debated before the community can accept a single theory, an amalgamated theory, or a collection of theories. In the participants' judgment, the publication and debate alone elevate the strategic perspective in regard to SOF. However, a single well-articulated and intellectually defensible unified theory might serve best—

¹⁵ COL C. E. Callwell, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice*, 3rd Edition, 1906: Reprint, Bison Books, 1996, p. 270.

professional development, practice, and justification of resources. JSOU should specifically target and *encourage and support research and publication on a theory of Special Operations*.



As important and necessary as developing intellectual foundations for SOF-Power and Special Operations is, intellectual foundations mean little if they are not inculcated within the force. How best to do that? Where does one turn to be educated in the strategic application of Special Operations or to peruse Special Operations strategic-level literature? Clearly education and access to knowledge are critical to a strategic culture and art. Current efforts notwithstanding, the

workshop participants found opportunities for improvement.

To that end, Captain Tom Sass, USN, SOF Chair at the Navy War College provided the workshop participants with a presentation on his establishment of an Advanced SOF Elective, and his methodologies for teaching SOF strategic art from a maritime SOF perspective. His briefing provided insightful ways to enhance courses for SOF curriculums at the PME institutions. He summarized his thoughts on the organizing concept of his course:

We require an operational concept to communicate our value to external customers. What is the purpose of our organization? This concept must clearly articulate our distinctive competencies and our ‘livelihood scheme’ (similar to a business model). What methods are we using to perform special operations functions? What are the means and ways? Our organization must describe our uniqueness and value to the nation by explaining how we are rare, valuable, non-imitable, and non-substitutable and represent a strategic option.

With this approach he is able to move the seminar out of the tactical weeds and into the strategic levels of policy, strategy, and force development and resourcing. Based on his own doctoral work, he wants students to understand why SOF provides policy makers a “differentiated option” and that SOF-Power will only exist if the force is sized appropriately to be both an economy of force and a choice of option for the challenges. His course takes his students out of their doctrinal and experiential comfort zones and requires them to think strategically.

Workshop members immediately recognized the value of this type of approach over what has historically occurred. The ensuing discussion revealed the obstacles to quality strategic SOF education are many: turnover of faculty, lack of faculty qualification, poor curriculum design, and lack of adequate instructional resource materials. No one found the predicament that new faculty, particularly military operators, find themselves in unusual circumstances; it is the reality of how the personnel system operates. A mechanism to educate SOF professionals on the aspects of Special Operations strategic art for those in the SOF community going off to teach at or attend educational institutions does not exist. It is a missed opportunity. The participants also thought this problem was larger than senior PME and even the military education system. The question the group focused on was how can JSOU help at this point? The conclusion was two-fold. First,

JSOU should develop appropriate SOF strategic art curriculums/perspectives and integrate them into the education of SOF and non-SOF PME.

Second, there is a knowledge management problem with the availability of Special Operations strategic thought and literature hampering efforts of those seeking access to this knowledge, as well as little guidance to the community of SOF learners on where “SOF Strategic Knowledge” resources are found. Obviously, JSOU continuously focuses on the knowledge management issue more generally, and the audience itself perhaps is not sufficiently proactive. However, it points to the need for a focal work. In essence, there is no “strategic-level” textbook or single source start point for a strategic appreciation of SOF. The group concluded JSOU should develop and publish a supporting strategic-level course textbook for SOF students consisting of the best strategic thought from SOF operators, leaders, theorists, strategists, and supporters. A SOF strategic perspective aggregated into a comprehensive text would serve educational purposes but also help inculcate a SOF strategic culture and practice of the strategic art within the community. It would be a source of SOF knowledge for future SOF warriors, general purpose forces, policy makers, and others.

The final effort of the working group was a brainstorming session to “operationalize” in greater detail the quest for Special Operations theory, SOF-Power articulation, and enhancement of SOF education and strategic art. The working group derived a list of specific recommendations as a way-ahead plan. The recommendations should serve as points of departure for various organizations and departments throughout the SOF community. Where it was possible to recommend responsibility for an action, the workshop participants provided their input. The group adopted a simple model for this session—placing the recommendations within short-term, mid-term, and long-term ranges based on the judgment of the group as to what could be accomplished optimally. Priorities were not assigned to the recommendations. These detailed recommendations are provided in Appendix A, SOF-Power Workshop Recommendations. The participants also brainstormed ideas for what should be included in a strategic-level curriculum. These are provided in Appendix B, Recommended Subjects for SOF Strategic Art Curriculum. Results of the brainstorming in regard to a text are provided at Appendix C, Recommended Subjects for SOF Strategic Art Curriculum.

Section VII: Recommendations and Conclusion

Special Operations are those activities of unorthodox nature applied to increase the fog and friction of war on our adversaries in any domain or across domains and in chaotic environments where adversaries may be unknown. If applied correctly, SOF-Power may achieve direct strategic effects in the arena of grand strategy, independent of operational art associated with campaign planning and operational level objectives. Consequently, Special Operations Forces are a unique instrument of national of power as well as a sub-element of the military instrument of power. As a distinct instrument of power, SOF increases the number and range of policy options available to political leadership. In military campaigns, SOF capabilities and operations are applied in cooperation with conventional force maneuver (or its inverse, conventional forces supporting SOF maneuver) to achieve strategic military objectives. The increased preference and applicability of SOF as a policy option makes Special Operations activities more critical in shaping a favorable 21st century environment. Future success requires a SOF strategic culture that constantly advances strategic thinking and education in a SOF strategic art. Such a culture must rest on the foundations of a unified theory of Special Operations and a body of knowledge to support the demands of educating a strategic force.

Fortunately, at this time the SOF community and its supporters are maturing in their understanding of the application of force and the emerging 21st century political-military environment. In the collective judgment of the workshop an opportunity exists to bridge the strategic gap in SOF thinking and create a strategic culture for the coming century based on the modern experience and emerging maturity of thought. The SOF-Power workshop recommends four major initiatives to be undertaken near-simultaneously and in a coordinated and integrated manner to advance the strategic art within SOF.

- Encourage and support research and publication on a theory of Special Operations.
- Encourage and support research and publication of works on SOF-Power and its applicability in the near and long term.
- Develop appropriate SOF strategic art curriculums/perspectives and integrate them into the education of SOF and non-SOF PME.
- Develop and publish a supporting strategic-level course textbook for SOF students consisting of the best strategic thought from SOF operators, leaders, theorists, strategists, and supporters.

These initiatives are outlined in great detail in Appendix A, SOF-Power Workshop Recommendations; Appendix B, Recommended Subjects for SOF Strategic Art Curriculum; and Appendix C, Recommended Subjects for SOF Strategic Art Curriculum. Taken together they provide a framework for moving forward over time. As in all strategy, a little done well now can create great positive change and avoid greater cost later. Progress depends on aggregating strategic thought about Special Operations in foundational, strategic documents and institutionalizing it into our higher SOF education and relationships with others in the national security community. The true gift to pass on to future warriors in the SOF community is knowledge.

The workshop concluded with an out brief and discussion with Dr. Brian Maher, JSOU President. Overall, the two-day session provided a great opportunity to consider the needs and challenges of advancing SOF strategic culture and art.

Appendix A: SOF-Power Workshop Recommendations

Short-Term

1. Advance the professional writing and thinking on Special Operations theory and SOF-Power through directed research at various PME, the ASD-SOLIC Writing Program, JSOU and NDIA SOLIC Essay Contest, and the JSOU Press; publish and maintain a SOF Strategic Art Reading List (See Appendix F).
2. Encourage and provide support for debates on Special Operations theory, SOF-Power, and strategic application of SOF through various workshop and symposia type events.
3. Encourage SOF PME chairs, SOF students, and Senior Fellows to publish papers on these subjects in professional journals; encourage senior members of SOF to publish strategic thought papers on their service within their service magazines and journals (as well as joint journals, foreign policy journals, counterterrorism journals, history magazines, etc.).
4. Incorporate SOF case studies at PME institutions that highlight Special Operations strategic application and SOF strategic utility. SOF case studies should also illustrate strategic objectives and concepts with respect to the application of SOF.
5. Encourage the enhancement of strategic art-level Special Operations classes at the various PME institutions and particularly in SOF Electives (see Appendix B); establish a SOF pre-War College course of 2–3 weeks, focused on SOF strategic-level subjects to prepare SOF students for better advocacy during their class year, creating a better prepared individual to learn, serve as a SOF instructional resource in seminar, and assume the role as an informed spokesperson.
6. Establish a central repository (a “center”) of Special Operations strategic thought for collaborative use by the SOF community; provide a central repository for SOF student papers, SOF instructor case studies, etc. Establish an initial research library on SOF matters pertaining to special warfare, IW, small wars, international relations, terrorism, etc.
7. Develop and publish a SOF course textbook with content at the operational art, strategic art, and theoretical art levels relevant to SOF (see Appendix C).
8. USSOCOM Commander appoint JSOU as the central point for SOF joint education.
9. Establish a SOF strategic-level curriculum at JSOU.
10. SOF community sponsor primary authors with scholastic credibility to write strategic history of SOF, Special Operations theory, SOF course textbooks, etc.
11. Conduct future symposia (ASD-SOLIC, USSOCOM, JSOU, etc.) with strategic art subjects and explorations on Special Operations theory and SOF-Power.
12. Publish JSOU monographs on Special Operations theory and SOF-Power.

13. Discuss means and establish objectives to incorporate Special Operations theory, SOF-Power and SOF strategic art and Force application into curriculums at the annual SOF Education Council meeting.

Mid-Term

1. Create a structured strategic art knowledge base for the SOF community.
2. Sponsor various authors and respected academics to provide additional expansions of Special Operations theory and SOF application.
3. Adapt SOF strategic curriculum courses for integration into Senior Service Colleges' (SSC) core courses, vice into SOF electives.
4. Research, study, and share articles and theories espoused by Coalition SOF.
5. Resource and direct SOF components (warfare centers) and their historians (includes USSOCOM) to write and publish SOF official histories (could incorporate SOF students seeking Masters and Ph.D.s into the project).
6. Publish a SOF Journal, which may be semiannual or quarterly, and includes tactical, operational, and strategic articles.

Long-Term

1. Establish a Joint Special Operations Research Center with a research library and strategic journal for publication.
2. Consider development of a School for Advanced Special Operations Warfare Studies (SASOWS), similar to the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) or the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAAS); incorporate Special Operations strategic art and war-fighting into the services' advanced course curriculums.
3. Establish a SOF Strategic Planners Course/Establish a Center for Special Operations Strategy.
4. Encourage publications on the nature and purpose of SOF components.
5. Build the bench of SOF theorists and authors.

Appendix B—Recommended Subjects for SOF Strategic Art Curriculum

Recommendations for Special Operations Strategic Art Curriculum Topics. The following list enumerates potential subjects for inclusion in any Special Operations strategic art course. (Note: Other than the first course, these topics are not in any particular order, and do not address the tactical and operational levels of war):

a. ***Review of Strategy and Grand Strategy.*** The course should begin with an overview, refresher course on the key attributes and principles of strategy and Grand Strategy. These topics are already being taught at War College level PME in depth, but a review would help to re-frame and refresh the topic. If attendees are not SSC graduates more would be required.

b. ***U.S. Diplomacy and Foreign Policy Formulation.*** These courses describe unique aspects of the conduct of American Foreign Policy and should describe the implications for SOF. The courses should also explore various interagency aspects of whole-of-government solutions, which require application of SOF, and should also, explore the role of SOF with the interagency.

c. ***Theory of Special Operations and SOF-Power.*** Review or overview of the body of literature on theories of Special Operations and the application of SOF-Power.

d. ***Strategic Leadership.*** This course is designed to study attributes and leadership methodologies of SOF leadership who have performed, or are performing at the strategic level, the issues they faced, and decisions made. Heavy use of guest speakers, both active duty and retired, would be beneficial. This course should include a case study conducted by the participant, along with a paper.

e. ***The Design of Strategic Vision and Direction.*** Teach the participants the best practices and methods, both from a military perspective and a civilian/business perspective, on the art of designing organizational visions and developing road maps for implementation. Identify strategic end-states appropriate for SOF.

f. ***The Nature, Purpose, and Utility of SOF as a Strategic Asset to the U.S.*** This instruction should explore the nature of SOF operations at the strategic level and the various aspects of why the nation created SOF, their intended purpose, function, and strategic utility (explore the value of Special Operations throughout the various campaign phases):

(1) Understand the utility of force at the strategic level (Colin Gray, General Rupert, and other theoretical works on strategic utility).

(2) Define and explore the facets of a SOF strategic culture. What constitutes a strategic culture? How is a SOF strategic culture fostered?

(3) Understand the history and evolution of SOF. This explores why and how the force has been strategically designed and employed and why various national strategies and external

threats have shaped U.S. SOF. This block of instruction should include background historical reading and may include case studies.

(4) Special Operations strategic functions (why we do what we do for the nation). Explore in-depth the application of force utility in the following areas:

- Strategic attack, countervailing, deterrence (force in-being) – these are our CT, Counter-Proliferation, and Counter-WMD skills.
- The gathering of Strategic Intelligence (Intentions and Warning).
- Influence Operations – MISO, CA, relationship building, ‘hearts and minds’, etc.
- Humanitarian – CA, CMO, HA, NEO, PKO, Disaster Relief, and to some extent, CN/CD.
- Political Warfare – UW, PSYWAR, COIN.
- Coercive Diplomacy – Flexible deterrent options with SOF components.
- Prevention/Phase 0 – BPC, SA, SFA, FID.
- Conflict – the range of Special Operations missions and tasks used to support the maneuver of conventional force campaign plans.

g. ***SOF Relevant Strategic Theories of Conflict.*** The Special Operations force has historically evolved as a psycho-social (MISO/CA/development), political (political warfare and instrument of grand strategy and foreign policy), and military (Special Operations used to enhance conventional force maneuver). Courses on strategic art will require exploring background theories and conflict theories in these three realms to determine our strategic utility to the nation, and to determine our essence and attributes for application of Special Operations to guarantee success. Theories relevant to Irregular Warfare should also be explored: Lawrence and Guerrilla Warfare, Mao on Exhaustion and Erosion, Sun Tzu, counterterrorism theoretical work, etc.

h. ***Strategic Influence Operations and Strategic Communication (for SOF).*** Explore building strategic relationships, how to ‘effect’ hearts and minds, strategically, MISO and PSYWAR. Understand Information Operations at a strategic level with relevance to SOF. Understand media and web 2.0, as well as social networking.

i. ***Strategic Resourcing.*** This aspect of the course should focus on at least two main areas:

- Strategic Budgeting – Understanding the budgeting system and resource authorities (Code 1206, 1208, Title 10, Title 32, Title 32, Title 50, etc.).
- Force Modernization – Special Operations system for force management and modernization.

j. ***The Role of the CFSOCC/JFSOCC in Theater Strategy and Campaigning.***

k. ***Special Operations Strategic Case Studies.*** Develop case studies illustrating where the application of SOF has achieved success in military operations at strategic and operational levels, or in the achievement of politic objectives as an instrument of foreign policy (or where misapplication of Special Operations thwarted success):

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- COIN in El Salvador.
 - OEF Afghanistan (UW to FID; FID to COIN).
 - Vietnam (Covert War, COIN, FID, etc.).
 - Persistence: Colombia (BPC, FID, CN/CD, SFA).
 - Humanitarian and PKO – Somalia, 1992 to 1995.

This could also include foreign examples, if they are highly illustrative of Special Operations:

- T.E. Lawrence's campaign during the Arab Revolt.
- Mao's campaign.
- Guerrilla warfare in Philippines.
- Oman insurgency and the Malayan insurgency.
- The Irish Troubles – Battles with the IRA.

l. ***Strategic Wargame or Strategic Decision-making Exercise.*** Patterned after United States Army War College or OSD Wargames with a SOF scenario to force Commander's Appreciation analysis, application of SOF methods, and initial Operational Design.

m. ***Directed readings from a Special Operations Strategic Reading List*** (A separate list to be developed by the community)

n. ***Strategic Writing and Publication.*** Institutionalize the requirement of SOF students and SOF PME chairs to contribute articles for publication. (Mandatory papers)

o. ***Orientation Trips.*** Conduct selected trips to various organizations and institutions with relevance to the applications of SOF, such as the National Counter Terrorism Center, theater commands, TSOCs, U.S. State Department, etc.

Appendix C: SOF Strategic Art Textbook Recommendations

The key component of Special Operations strategic art--its power as a distinct component and contributor of our defense establishment--should be presented in a consolidated book format, derived from sources and writings inherently recognized as relevant to Special Operations. The course textbook should present the foundational underpinnings from conflict theories that explain the nature of Special Operations and why they work. Both historical and contemporary theorists could contribute to this work. With this as backdrop, thinkers and intellectuals recognized throughout the SOF community could collaborate to capture the essence of what SOF-Power constitutes, followed by our strategists and practitioners contributing thoughts on Special Operations strategic concepts, application of force, and utility. Borrowing from the style of several works on service-power related writings, the framework for selected readings on "Special Operations Forces Power for the 21st Century" textbook could include the following:

- a. Introduction to Special Operations and the key contributions throughout history made by application of Special Operations.
- b. The future security environment (as SOF sees it through strategic appreciation) and the implications on the roles, missions, and application of Special Operations. This security environment would include terrorism, expeditionary operations, global and distributed operations, transnational threats as well as a security paradigm of working with or enabling partners and allies. The threat actors and Tactics, Techniques and Procedures are presented from the perspective of their impact on SOF. The requirement for key enablers is spelled out and the 'presentation of the force' is offered (SOF-Power).
- c. The theory of Special Operations. The theory section explores various elements of conflict and political warfare theory that have application to Special Operations (Sun Tzu, Delbrück's war of exhaustion, Mao, Machiavelli, etc.). Include contemporary theorists and writings covering unconventional warfare, irregular warfare, psychological warfare, etc. (and specific theory writings such as Admiral McRaven's *Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare – Theory and Practice*). Also, Special Operations strategic schools of thought would be covered – direct/indirect, global vs. expeditionary, etc. Ultimately, this part must encapsulate:
 - a. The distilled essence of Special Operations power – its purpose and nature.
 - b. This section covers the unique mediums where SOF operates, such as in political warfare, human influence operations (human terrain and cognitive medium), and irregular warfare which distinguish Special Operations operating mediums from the other services (air and space, maritime, land).
 - c. This part also explains how SOF Power supports whole of government approaches and interagency integration.
 - d. A description of Special Operations strategic culture, our organizational ethos, and our experientially derived principles for employment of the force will contribute to the understanding of Special Operations in peace and in wartime.
 - e. The strategic utility contributions of SOF as described through strategic concepts for their employment. Strategic concepts for SOF would include (but not be limited to): UW, enhancing conventional force maneuver (FID, SR, DA, CA, MISO), instruments of

foreign policy (Phase 0—SOF diplomacy and preventative war; political warfare), deterrence and global countervailing, etc. It must explore what specific things Special Operations accomplishes in these environments (the tools in the SOF tool box).

Additional parts explore:

- a. Various SOF campaigns through the use of historical case studies – SOF only, SOF integrated and SOF in support of General Purpose Forces campaigns (various SOF campaign designs – UW, COIN, etc.).
- b. Various authorities used by SOF (Title 10, 22, 50, etc.).
- c. SOF strategic leadership – Issues and decision-making.
- d. The role of innovation and technology in shaping the strategic applications of Special Operations.
- e. Resourcing and enablers for SOF.
- f. SOF command and control.
- g. Force development.
- h. The contributions of Coalition SOF.
- i. An illustration of the utility of Special Operations through a future theater concept scenario to highlight various strategies for the employment of Special Operations.

Appendix D: SOF-Power Workshop Participants and Contributors

Workshop Participants

Joseph Celeski COL (Ret) USA, JSOU Senior Fellow (Moderator)

Steve Davis, Col (Ret) USMC, past Deputy Commander MARSOC, JSOU Senior Fellow

John Jogerst, Col (Ret) USAF, past AWC SOF Chair, Commandant USAFSOS, JSOU Senior Fellow

LTC Michael Lewis, USA, SOF Chair, United States Marine Corps University

Joseph Osborne, COL (Ret) USA, Former USSOCOM J10, SOCCENT J3, and JSOU Senior Fellow

Col Patrick Pihana, USAF, SOF Chair, National Defense University

Kenneth H. Poole, Col (Ret), USAF, Director, Strategic Studies Department, JSOU

Charles Ricks, COL, (Ret), USA, JSOU Senior Fellow

Richard Shultz, Ph. D., Tufts University, JSOU Senior Fellow

CAPT Tom Sass, USN, SOF Chair, Navy War College

Harry (Rich) Yarger, Ph. D., JSOU Senior Fellow

Appendix E: Workshop Agenda

Tuesday, 23 August

- 0800 – 0815 Admin Remarks and Introduction of Participants
- 0815 – 0900 Group Discussion on Framing the Problem/Requirement
- 0900 – 1000 COL (Retired) Joseph Celeski - SOF Strategic Art and Schools of Thought
- 1000 – 1200 Exploration of SOF Environments and Domains
- 1200 – 1300 Working Lunch with JSOU President, Dr. Brian Maher
- 1300 – 1530 Developing Military Theory for Special Operations
- 1530 – 1630 Exploring the Nature of SOF-Power

Wednesday, 24 August

- 0800 – 1100 Continued Discussion on Special Operations Theory and SOF-Power
- 1100 – 1200 Working group for Development of SOF pre-War College Strategic Course
- 1200 – 1300 Lunch
- 1300 – 1330 Designing a SOF Strategic Textbook
- 1330 – 1430 CAPT Sass, Naval War College – “Special Operations Forces as an Economy of Force Capability – Teaching Maritime SOF Strategic Art Approach”
- 1430 – 1530 Recommendations and Way-Ahead Road Map
- 1530 – 1630 Out-brief and Discussion with Dr. Brian Maher
- 1630 – 1700 Concluding Remarks

Appendix F: References and Strategic Art Reading List

This list serves as a starting point for literature and readings that have strategic implications and value to SOF. It does not comprise a list of works on tactical or operational methods or art.

Conflict Theory and Strategy Applicable to SOF

Barnett, Frank R. and B. Hugh Tovar, Richard H. Shultz (editors). *Special Operations in US Strategy*. National Defense University Press, Washington, DC: 1984.

Clausewitz, Carl Von. *On War*. Penguin Books, London, UK: 1968.

Collins, John M. *Military Strategy: Principles, Practices, and Historical Perspectives*. Brassey's Inc., Washington, DC: 2002.

Gray, Colin S. *Explorations in Strategy*. Praeger, Westport, CT: 1996.

Gray, Colin S. *Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare*. Phoenix, London: 2005.

Gray, Colin S. *Modern Strategy*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK: 1999.

Huang, J.H. (editor). *Sun Tzu – The Art of War*. Quill, William and Morrow, New York: 1993.

Kiras, James D. *Special Operations and Strategy: From World War II to the War on Terrorism*. Routledge, New York: 2006.

McRaven, William H. (Admiral, USN). *Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare – Theory and Practice*. Ballantine Books, New York: 1995.

Murray, Williamson and MacGregor Knox, Alvin Bernstein (editors). *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War*. Cambridge University Press, New York: 1994.

McIvor, Anthony D. (editor). *Rethinking the Principles of War*. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD: 2005.

National Security Strategy 2010.

National Military Strategy 2011.

The National Strategy for Counterterrorism. June 2011.

USSOCOM Pub 1. 5 August 2011.

USSOCOM Strategy 2010.

USSOCOM Strategic Appreciation.

Yarger, Harry R. *Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy*. The Letort Papers, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA: 2009.

Irregular Warfare Conflict Theory

Galula, David. *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*. Praeger Security International. Westport, CT: 2006.

Guevara, Che. *Guerrilla Warfare*. University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, NE: 1998.

Joes, Anthony James. *Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency*. The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, KY: 2004.

Lawrence, T.E. *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*. Doubleday, Doran and Co., Garden City, NY: 1935.

Marx, Karl. *The Communist Manifesto*. W.W. Norton and Co., New York: 1988.

O'Neill, Bard E. *Insurgency & Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse*. Potomac Books Inc., Washington, DC: 2005.

Trinquier, Roger. *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*. Combat Studies Institute, Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Jan 1985.

Tse-Tung, Mao. *On Guerrilla Warfare*. Praeger, New York: 1961.

The Use and Utility of Force; Force Fungibles

Art, Robert J. and Kenneth N. Waltz (editors). *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. Boulder, CO: 2009.

Smith, Rupert (General). *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*. Alfred E. Knopf, New York: 2007.

SOF Attributes, Nature, Strategic Utility, and Purpose

Adams, Thomas K. *U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare*. Frank Cass, Portland, OR: 1998.

Clancy, Tom. *Shadow Warriors: Inside the Special Forces*. G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York: 2002.

Hayden, H.T. (LtCol, USMC). *Shadow War: Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict*. Pacific Aero Press, Vista, CA: 1992.

Horn, Bernd and J. Paul de B. Taillon, David Last. *Force of Choice: Perspectives on Special Operations*. McGill-Queen's University Press, Kingston, Canada: 2004.

Marquis, Susan L. *Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces*. Brookings Institute Press, Washington, DC: 1997.

Rothstein, Hy S. *Afghanistan & the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare*. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD: 2006.

Tucker, David and Christopher J. Lamb. *United States Special Operations Forces*. Columbia University Press, New York: 2007.

Vandenbroucke, Lucien S. *Perilous Options: Special Operations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy*. Oxford University Press, New York: 1993.

The History of SOF (Strategic Use)

Arquilla, John. *From Troy to Entebbe: Special Operations in Ancient Times and Modern Times*. University Press of America, New York: 1996.

Bahmanyar, Mir. *Shadow Warriors: A History of the US Army Rangers*. Osprey Publishing, New York: 2005.

Briscoe, Charles H. and Richard L. Kiper, James A. Schroeder, Kalev I. Sepp. *Weapon of Choice: U.S. Army Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan*. Combat Studies Institute Press, Ft. Leavenworth, KS: 2003.

Corum, James S. and Wray R. Johnson. *Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists*. University Press of Kansas, KS: 2003.

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Kyle, James H. (COL, USAF). *The Guts to Try: The Untold Story of the Hostage Rescue Mission by the On-scene Desert Commander*. Orion Books, New York: 1990.

Leebaert, Derek. *To Dare & to Conquer: Special Operations and the Destiny of Nations, from Achilles to Al Qaeda*. Little, Brown, and Company, New York: 2006.

Robinson, Linda. *Masters of Chaos: The Secret History of the Special Forces*. Public Affairs, New York: 2004.

Shultz, Richard H. Jr. *The Secret War Against Hanoi: The Untold Story of Spies, Saboteurs and Covert Warriors in North Vietnam*. Perennial, New York: 1999.

Smith, Bradley F. *The Shadow Warriors: OSS and the Origins of the CIA*. Basic Books Inc., New York: 1983.

Diplomacy and Statecraft; Foreign Policy

Kissinger, Henry. *Diplomacy*. Simon and Schuster, New York: 1994.

Waller, Michael J. *Strategic Influence: Public Diplomacy, Counterpropaganda and Political Warfare*. Institute of World Politics Press, Washington, DC: 2008.

Waller, Michael J. *The Public Diplomacy Reader*. The Institute of World Politics Press, Washington, DC: 2007.

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Bondanella, Peter and Mark Musa (editors). *The Portable Machiavelli*. Viking Penguin, Inc., New York: 1979.

Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. Edited by Anatol Rapoport, Penguin Books, New York: 1968.

Griffith, Samuel B., (BrigGen (Ret) USMC). *On Guerrilla Warfare – Mao Tse-Tung*. Praeger, New York: 1961.

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Sheng, Wang (General). *Theory and Practice of Political Warfare*. General Political Warfare College Essays, Taipei, China, published in English by Hsin Kwang-hsu: 1973.

Political Warfare Readings

Chau, Donovan C. “*Political Warfare – An Essential Instrument of U.S. Grand Strategy Today*.” *Comparative Strategy: An International Journal*, Vol. 25, No. 2, June 2006, Routledge: Taylor & Francis Group, UK: pp. 109 – 120.

Codevilla, Angelo and Paul Seabury. *War: Ends and Means* (2nd Ed.). Potomac Books, Washington, DC: 2006.

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Kennan, George. Policy Planning Staff Memorandum (reference to NSC 10/2 – Top Secret). National Archives and Records Administration, RG273, Records of the National Security Council, Washington, DC, May 4, 1948; pg. 269.

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